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Abstract 
 
With a new quarterly dataset we estimate a Bayesian Structural Autoregression model 
and a Fully Simultaneous System approach to analyze the macroeconomic effects of 
fiscal policy. Results show that positive government spending shocks, in general, have a 
negative effect on real GDP; lead to “crowding-out” effects of private consumption and 
investment; have a persistent and positive effect on the price level and a mixed impact 
on the average financing cost of government debt. Explicitly considering the 
government debt dynamics in the model is also important. A VAR counter-factual 
exercise confirms that unexpected positive spending shocks create relevant “crowding-
out” effects.  
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1. Introduction 
In the last twenty years, public spending control has been a major problem in 
Portugal. The gains from the drop in interest rates and, consequently, in the interest 
payments on the outstanding government debt were not accompanied by a sustained 
consolidation of public finances. Moreover, the episodes of fiscal improvement that 
occurred in the 1980s and in the 1990s have been short-termed and mostly not 
successful. Following the introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), Portugal 
was the first country in the Economic and Monetary Union to breach the 3% of GDP 
reference value for the government deficit in 2001. Consequently, it became subject to 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) in 2002, a situation that occurred again in 2005.  
Therefore, given past performance and outcomes, it seems fair to say that after 
entering the European Union (EU) in 1986, joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1992 and entering EMU in January 
1999, Portugal’s fiscal track record could have been better.  
In this context, the evaluation of the effects of fiscal policy on economic activity 
in Portugal becomes relevant and is the major goal of this paper. Additionally, we look 
at its impact on the composition of GDP, therefore, analyzing potential “crowding-out” 
effects on private consumption and private investment.  
Fiscal policy shocks are identified using a recursive partial identification 
scheme
1
 and we assess the posterior uncertainty of the impulse-response functions by 
estimating a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression (B-SVAR) model. We also 
account for the automatic response of fiscal policy to the economic activity, and use a 
Fully Simultaneous System approach in line with the works of Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002), Leeper and Zha (2003) and Sims and Zha (1999, 2006). In addition, we consider 
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 Christiano et al. (2005) identify the monetary policy shock using the same procedure. 
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the response of fiscal variables to the level of the government debt following Favero 
and Giavazzi (2007) and Afonso and Sousa (2009a). 
Another important contribution of the paper is the use of a set of quarterly fiscal 
data, which we build by drawing on the higher frequency (monthly) availability of fiscal 
cash data. This allows us to identify more precisely the effects of fiscal policy. 
The findings of this paper can be summarized as follows. On the one hand, 
government spending shocks: (i) have a negative effect on real GDP; (ii) generate 
substantial “crowding-out” effects and lead to a fall in both private consumption and 
private investment; (iii) have a persistent and positive impact on the price level; and (iv) 
have mixed impacts on the average cost of refinancing the debt. Therefore, and from a 
policymaking perspective, increasing government spending does not emerge as an 
obvious instrument to help fostering economic activity. 
On the other hand, government revenue shocks: (i) have a negative impact on 
GDP; (ii) crowd-out private consumption and private investment, although the response 
emerges with a lag of about four quarters; and (iii) is normally followed by a somewhat 
less disciplined fiscal policy. 
The consideration of the feedback from government debt makes the effects of 
fiscal policy on (long-term) interest rates and GDP more persistent and these variables 
are also more responsive to the shocks. Moreover, the results do not seem to support the 
existence of a significant stabilizing response of the budget balance to the debt level. In 
fact, there is only weak evidence suggesting that: (i) government spending falls when 
the debt-to-GDP ratio is above its mean (in particular, in the period 1979:1-1993:3); and 
(ii) government revenue increases when the debt-to-GDP ratio is above its mean 
(namely, in the period 1993:4-2007:4, that is, after the Maastricht Treaty). Therefore, 
there was a possible Ricardian behaviour after the beginning of the 1990s, although the 
 4 
past fiscal stabilization attempts have been mostly biased towards increases in 
government revenue, without tackling sufficiently the spending side. Moreover, and as 
we will see below, the breaching of the SGP by Portugal in 2002 cannot be 
disconnected from such past fiscal responses. Finally, a VAR counterfactual exercise 
shows that unexpected increases in government spending lead to important “crowding-
out” effects. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the related 
literature. Section three presents fiscal developments in Portugal. Section four explains 
the empirical strategies used to identify the effects of fiscal policy shocks. Section five 
describes the data and provides the empirical analysis. Section six concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Despite the large literature on the impact of monetary policy on economic 
activity, the importance of fiscal policy for economic stabilization has received less 
attention. This section provides a brief review of the existing evidence of the effects of 
fiscal policy on GDP, the aggregate price level and the composition of output, that is, 
private consumption and private investment. 
For the U.S., different approaches have been used in the identification of the 
fiscal policy shock. The “narrative approach” developed by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) 
isolates political events and finds that, after a brief rise in government spending, 
durables consumption falls while nondurable consumption displays a small decline. 
Fatás and Mihov (2001) use a Cholesky ordering and show that increases in government 
expenditures are expansionary, but lead to important changes in the composition of 
output in the form of an increase in private investment that more than compensates for 
the fall in private consumption. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identify the automatic 
 5 
response of fiscal policy by using information about the elasticity of fiscal variables, 
and find that fiscal shocks are expansionary, have a positive effect on private 
consumption, and a negative impact on private investment. More recently, Mountford 
and Uhlig (2009) relying on sign restrictions for the fiscal impulse-response functions 
find a negative effect in residential and non-residential investment for the U.S.. 
At the international level, the evidence is scarce due to the limited availability of 
quarterly public finance data. Perotti (2004) finds that fiscal policy leads to no response 
of private investment and a relatively large and positive effect on private consumption 
in a set of five countries (Australia, Canada, Germany, the U.S. and the U.K.). For 
France, Biau and Girard (2005) find a positive effect on both private consumption and 
private investment. For Spain, De Castro and Hernández de Cos (2008) show that a 
positive spending shock lead to higher inflation and lower output in the medium and 
long-term, but can be expansionary in the short-term. Heppke-Falk et al. (2006) and 
Giordano et al. (2007) find that government spending has expansionary effects on both 
output and private consumption for, respectively, Germany and Italy. Afonso and Sousa 
(2009a, 2009b) show that, for the U.S., the U.K., Germany and Italy, quarterly fiscal 
policy shocks have important macroeconomic effects while also impacting on housing 
and stock prices. In addition, Burriel et al. (2010), using a quarterly standard SVAR, 
report that expenditure shocks are more persistent in the US than in the euro area, while 
the negative response from net tax increases is shorter lived in the euro area. 
As can be inferred from the abovementioned studies, data availability – in 
particular, high frequency data –, remains a major drawback in the literature on fiscal 
policy. Therefore, we try to overcome this issue, by building also a fiscal quarterly 
dataset for Portugal.  
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3. Recent Fiscal Developments in Portugal 
According to Afonso and Claeys (2008), the main reasons for the three initial 
breaches of the SGP in 2002 and 2003 were expenditure rises in France and Portugal, 
while large revenue reductions unmatched by expenditure cuts in Germany pushed the 
budget deficit beyond 3 per cent of GDP. Therefore, this evidence, points to some 
difficulties related to expenditure control in Portugal. 
In 2003 and 2004, Portugal used sizable temporary measures, amounting 
respectively to 2.5 and 2.3 per cent of GDP, in order to keep the budget deficit below 
the 3 per cent limit. Overall, such temporary measures implemented in the 2002-2004 
period, added up to 6.2 per cent of GDP.
2
 
The adoption of temporary corrective measures, even if it prevented the budget 
deficit from going above the 3 per cent limit, did not address the structural factors 
underlying Portuguese fiscal imbalances. Additionally, after the 2002 EDP, the 
consolidation strategy also included an increase in the standard VAT rate (from 17 to 19 
per cent, which was again raised to 21 per cent in July 2005, but cut back to 20 per cent 
in July 2009), while primary spending continued rising.
3
 
A second EDP was started in June 2005 and was abrogated in June 2008. 
Among the several measures then proposed and implemented by the authorities to 
control primary spending, one can mention as some of the more structurally oriented 
ones, for instance, the revision of the civil servants’ pension schemes, and the reform of 
the health care sector.
4
 Interestingly, both EDP episodes that occurred in Portugal were 
characterised by fiscal easing, but while the 2001 episode was coupled with more 
                                                          
2 For instance, pension funds transfers from public sector enterprises to the civil servants pension system 
in 2004; securitization of tax credits in 2003; and tax amnesty in 2002. 
3 Guichard and Leibfritz (2006) also survey the reasons for the non-successful fiscal adjustment in the 
period 2002-2004. 
4 Since 2002, some public hospitals have been transformed into public corporations, to increase 
efficiency and decrease costs in the National Health Service (NHS). However, Afonso and Fernandes 
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favourable monetary conditions, in the 2005 episode monetary conditions were more 
stringent (see Figure 1). 
[Figure 1] 
After entering the EU in 1986, both inflation and interest rates in Portugal 
decreased steadily and converged towards the lower levels that were more common in 
other countries already in the EU. This was an obvious benefit from entering the EU, 
with capital markets adjusting expectations vis-à-vis Portugal, which also allowed for 
better and more stable sovereign debt ratings attributed to the country.  
Regarding the past experiences in terms of fiscal consolidations, fiscal episodes 
can be identified based on the change in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance. 
For this purpose, Afonso (2010) determines for the EU countries the periods when the 
change in the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance is at least 2 percentage points 
(pp) of GDP in one year or at least 1.5 pp points on average in the last two years. For 
the case of Portugal, two episodes of fiscal expansion (1980-1981, 2005) and three 
episodes of fiscal contraction can be reported (1982-83, 1986, and 1992).
5
 Following 
such approach, we can also observe an additional fiscal contraction in 2006-2007. 
The abovementioned fiscal consolidation episodes were, on the one hand short-
termed, and on the other hand mostly unsuccessful. During the 1982-83 consolidation 
both expenditures and revenues increased, as a share of GDP, while the debt-to-GDP 
ratio kept on increasing at the same time.
6
 In the 1986 consolidation (the year of 
Portugal’s entry in the EU), one observes a certain stabilization of revenues as a share of 
GDP, a decrease in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio, and also a decrease in the debt ratio in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(2008) did not find, for the period 2000-2005, significant differences in efficiency between hospitals with 
public corporations status and Administrative Public Sector hospitals. 
5 Blanchard (2007) argues that discretionary fiscal policy was expansionary in Portugal in 1995-2001. 
6 The Portuguese Escudo effective exchange rate faced a devaluation of 17 and 23 per cent respectively 
in 1982 and 1983, while Portugal undertook an IMF stabilisation programme. 
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the following three years. Additionally, the primary balance was also in surplus for the 
first time in thirteen years.  
Finally, the 1992 episode was very short-termed, taking place in a difficult 
environment, following revenue and expenditure increases with the debt ratio rising 
immediately afterwards.
7
 Moreover, the 1993 economic downturn in Europe did not 
play in favour of prolonging the consolidation, with the primary spending-to-GDP ratio 
increasing more significantly in that year. Indeed, a commonly known feature of fiscal 
policies in Portugal in the past has been the pro-cyclical behaviour of primary spending, 
which contributed to prevent the implementation of successful fiscal consolidations 
(see, for instance, Pina, 2004). Such pro-cyclical behaviour would again be present in 
2001, with the budget deficit going once more above the 3 per cent limit. 
 
4. Modelling Strategies 
4.1 The Bayesian Structural VAR 
The first methodology used to analyze the macroeconomic effects of fiscal 
policy consists on the estimation of the following Structural VAR (SVAR) 
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7 Additionally, in 1992 and in 1993 privatisation revenues amounting respectively to 1.5 and 0.4 per cent 
of GDP were used for debt redemption. Coincidentally Portugal entered the ERM in April 1992, precisely 
the year were several currencies in the ERM system undergone speculative attacks, forcing both the 
Italian Lira and the British Pound out of the system after September 2002. 
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where ),0(~ ,| 

tsX st , Γ(L) is a matrix valued polynomial in positive powers of 
the lag operator L, n is the number of variables in the system, εt is the fundamental 
economic shock, and vt is the VAR innovation. 
Equation (2) describes the government’s budget constraint, and it, Gt, Tt, πt, Yt, 
Pt, t  and dt represent, respectively, the average cost of debt refinancing, government 
primary spending, government revenues, inflation, GDP, price level, real growth rate of 
GDP, and the debt-to-GDP ratio at the beginning of the period t. 
The specification follows Favero and Giavazzi (2007) in that we include the 
government debt dynamics, namely, by appending the non-linear budget identity to the 
VAR. 
We use a recursive identification scheme and characterize fiscal policy as 
follows: 
G
ttt fG  )(     (4) 
T
ttt gT  )(     (5) 
where, Gt is the government primary spending, Tt is the government revenue, f and g are 
linear functions, t  is the information set, and 
G
t  and 
T
t  are, respectively, the 
government spending shock and the government revenue shock, which are orthogonal 
to the elements in t . 
We assume that the variables in Xt can be separated into 2 groups: (i) a subset of 
n1 variables, X1t (GDP, GDP deflator, consumption, investment, cost of debt), whose 
contemporaneous values appear in the policy function and do not respond 
contemporaneously to the fiscal policy shocks; and (ii) the policy variables in the form 
of government primary expenditure, Gt, and/or government revenue, Tt. 
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Therefore, the recursive assumptions can be represented by  '1 ,, tttt GTXX   
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This approach is also used by Christiano et al. (2005) in the context of identification of 
unexpected variation in monetary policy. Finally, we follow Sims and Zha (1999) and 
assess the posterior uncertainty about the impulse-response functions by using a Monte 
Carlo Markov-Chain (MCMC) algorithm.  
 
4.2 The Fully Simultaneous System Approach 
The second methodology used in the identification of fiscal policy shocks relies 
on a Fully Simultaneous System of Equations approach in a Bayesian framework. 
We start by considering the structural VAR represented by (1), (2) and (3). The 
set of variables included in the system is  ',,,, tttttt iPYTGX  , Gt, the government 
primary expenditures, Tt, the government revenue, Yt, the GDP,  Pt, the GDP deflator, 
and it, the average cost of debt financing. 
The economy is divided into two sectors: a public and a production sector. The 
public sector – that allows for simultaneous effects –, comprises the equations for 
government primary spending and government revenue, and links them with the log real 
GDP, the GDP deflator, and the average cost of financing debt. The production sector 
consists of log real GDP, and the GDP deflator. 
Additionally, we follow Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004), and 
assess the automatic response of taxes and government primary spending to economic 
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activity by computing the elasticity of government revenue and spending to 
macroeconomic variables. 
The restrictions on the matrix of contemporaneous effects, Γ0, that allow us to 
identify the fiscal policy shock can be defined as 
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where the parameters ij  represent the elasticity of the fiscal policy instrument i with 
respect to the macroeconomic variable j. Table 1 reports the elasticities used in the 
identification procedure. 
 
Table 1 – Elasticities of Government Spending and Revenue. 
 Elasticities of Government Spending Elasticities of Government Revenue 
 
YG ,   ,G  iG ,  YT ,   ,T  iT ,  
 0 -0.5 0 1.6 1.25 0 
Note: The estimates of the elasticities are based on Girouard and André (2005), although the results are 
not sensitive to changes in parameters. 
 
Finally, we use Bayesian inference to assess the posterior uncertainty about the 
impulse-response functions in the Fully Simultaneous system of equations as in Leeper 
and Zha (2003), and Sims and Zha (1999, 2006), and consider a Monte Carlo 
Importance Sampling Normalized Weights algorithm. 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1 Data 
This section provides a summary description of the data employed in the 
empirical analysis. A detailed description is provided in the appendix. All variables are 
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in natural logarithms unless stated otherwise and the data covers the period 1978:1-
2007:4. 
In the recursive partial identification scheme, the variables that are 
predetermined with respect to fiscal policy innovations are the GDP, private 
consumption, private investment, and GDP deflator. To these variables, we add the 
average cost of government debt financing (or the yield to maturity of long-term 
government bonds).
8
 As measure of the fiscal policy instruments, we use either the 
government expenditures (and government revenues are included in X1t) or the 
government revenues (in which case, government expenditures are included in X1t). 
In the Fully Simultaneous System approach, we restrict the set of variables to the 
GDP, GDP deflator, the average cost of debt financing and the fiscal policy instruments. 
In both frameworks, we include a constant (or quarterly seasonal dummies), and the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio in the set of exogenous variables. All variables were 
deflated by the GDP deflator (2000=100). 
Figure 2 plots the average debt cost servicing and the nominal (annualized) GDP 
growth. It shows that Portugal, in general, has moved from a situation where nominal 
GDP growth exceeded the cost of financing the debt to a situation where the converse 
has been true. 
In addition, Figure 3 displays the observed debt-to-GDP ratio and the implicit 
debt-to-GDP ratio, that is, the one that emerges from the government debt’s feedback. 
As can be seen, the implicit series for the debt-to-GDP ratio tracks pretty well the actual 
series. 
[Figure 2]  
[Figure 3] 
                                                          
8 The average government debt cost is obtained by dividing the net interest payments in t by the 
government debt at time t−1. 
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Finally, the quarterly series of government spending and revenues are computed 
using the monthly Central Government’s cash data. 
 
5.2 Results 
5.2.1 The Bayesian Structural VAR 
 We start by estimating a B-SVAR model that does not include the feedback 
from government debt, that is, where equation (2) is not considered. Then, we compare 
the results with the ones that emerge from estimating specifications (1), (2), and (3). 
Figure 4 shows the impulse-response functions to a fiscal policy shock. The 
solid line refers to the median response when the VAR is estimated without the 
feedback from government debt, and the dashed lines are, respectively, the median 
response and the 68 per cent posterior confidence intervals from the VAR estimated by 
imposing the debt dynamics. The confidence bands are constructed using a Monte Carlo 
Markov-Chain (MCMC) algorithm based on 50000 draws. 
[Figure 4] 
 Figure 4a displays the impulse-response functions of all variables in Xt to a 
positive shock in government primary spending. In the case we do not include the debt 
feedback, it can be seen that government spending declines steadily following the 
shock, and the effect roughly vanishes after eight quarters. The effects on GDP are 
negative and reveal that government spending has a strong “crowding-out” effect on the 
private sector. In fact, both private consumption and private investment fall after the 
shock. In particular, a 6% shock in government spending leads to a 0.5% fall in GDP six 
quarters ahead. Similarly, private consumption falls by 0.6%, while the effects in 
private investment are more pronnounced (a fall of 1% at the horizon of six quarters). 
These results are in line with the works of Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Alesina and 
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Ardagna (1998) who uncovered the presence of “non-Keynesian effects” (i.e., negative 
spending multipliers) during large fiscal consolidations. 
In addition, there is a positive effect on the average cost of debt that reaches its 
peak after six quarters. The price level is also impacted persistently and positively by 
the shock in government spending. Finally, the results suggest that after a government 
spending shock, there is an increase in government revenue which is, however, small. 
Therefore, this suggests that an expansion of government spending is associated with a 
episode of fiscal deterioration. 
When we include the debt dynamics in the model, the effects of a government 
spending shock on the average cost of debt become somewhat larger while the impact 
on GDP is marginally smaller. Additionally, investment consistently falls much more 
than before and the positive impact on the price level is attenuated by the feedback from 
government debt.  
 Figure 4b shows the impulse-response functions to a positive shock in 
government revenue. The results suggest that government revenue declines after the 
shock which erodes in about eight quarters. The effects on GDP, private consumption 
and private investment are slightly positive over the four quarters following the shock, 
but they quickly mean revert and become negative. In fact, a 5% shock in government 
revenue has its maximum impact on GDP (0.3%), private consumption (0.2%) and 
private investment (0.7%) at the four quarters horizon, after which the effects erode and 
change sign. These results are in accordance to the findings of Giavazzi et al. (2000) 
who show that a rise of taxes can have a positive impact on private consumption in 
periods of fiscal consolidation. In contrast, the price level falls for about four quarters, 
then recovers, and becomes positive. This evidence is closely related to the reaction of 
government spending, which increases after the shock. In fact, an increase in 
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government revenue is followed by a somewhat less disciplined fiscal policy and, as a 
result, there is a deterioration of the fiscal balance. This also seems to be the reason for 
the positive impact on the average cost of debt, implying that the authorities should be 
aware of such market reactions when implementing fiscal policy. 
In terms of the forecast error-variance decomposition of the variables in the 
system to a shock in government spending or revenue  (not shown for space sake), both 
shocks account for a large fraction of their own forecast-error variance decomposition, 
and play a negligible role for the remaining variables. 
 
5.2.2 The Fully Simultaneous System Approach 
 Figure 5 displays the impulse-response functions to a fiscal policy shock in the 
Fully Simultaneous System approach. The solid line refers to the median response when 
the system is estimated without imposing the dynamics from government debt, and the 
dashed lines are, respectively, the median response and the 68 per cent posterior 
confidence intervals from the system estimated by including the feedback from 
government debt. The confidence bands are constructed using an Importance Sampling 
Normalized Weights algorithm based on 50000 draws. 
[Figure 5] 
 Figure 5a displays the impulse-response functions of all variables to a positive 
shock in government primary spending. When we do not take into account the feedback 
from government debt, one can see that the shock to government spending erodes after 
four quarters. The effects on GDP are negative – therefore, denoting the presence of 
“non-Keynesian effects” - and the trough is reached after four quarters. At this horizon, 
a 3% shock in government spending leads to a fall of GDP of between 0.2% and 0.4%. 
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As in the case of the recursive partial identification scheme, the impact on the 
price level is positive, although somewhat less persistent, and there is also a fiscal 
deterioration as government revenues fall after the shock. In contrast, there is a negative 
effect on the average cost of debt that reaches its trough after six quarters. 
When the debt dynamics is included in the model, the effects of a government 
spending shock: (i) on GDP are smaller; (ii) become larger in the case of the average 
cost of debt; and (iii) are somewhat smaller for the price level.  
 Figure 5b shows the impulse-response functions to a positive government 
revenue shock. The (negative) response of GDP is not lagged, despite being gradual. 
The trough is achieved after eight quarters, where a 3% shock in government revenue 
reduces GDP by about 0.4%. Similarly, the price level does not react with a lag but 
gradually increases instead, and the effect is very persistent. These pieces of evidence 
can not be separated from the behaviour of government spending, which increases after 
the shock, therefore, suggesting a deterioration of public finances. In fact, the average 
cost of debt is positively impacted, reflecting the less disciplined fiscal policy. 
 
5.3 Fiscal shocks and government debt feedback 
In this sub-section, we consider the potential debt feedback by estimating the 
following structural VAR: 
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Specification (8) is suggested by Bohn (1998) who considers a fiscal reaction 
function in which d* is the unconditional mean of the debt ratio. In the same spirit, 
Romer and Romer (2007) suggest that the effect of a tax shock on output may be 
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conditional on the government’s aim to stabilize the debt. Therefore, we model the 
target level of the debt as a constant on the basis of the evidence of stationarity of d. 
The estimated coefficients on (dt−1 − d*) in the structural equations of the SVAR 
(government spending and government revenue) are reported in Table 2. We consider 
the full sample and two sub-samples: 1979:1 – 1993:3, corresponding to the period 
before the Maastricht Treaty entered into force; and 1993:4 – 2007:4, thereafter.  
 
Table 2 – The effect of (dt-1-d*) in a VAR. 
  Tt Gt 
 1979:1 - 2007:4 
(N=116) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
 
(dt-1-d*) 
1979:1 - 1993:3 
(N=59) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
 1993:4 - 2007:4 
(N=57) 
0.006* 
(0.03) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
           Note: standard errors in brackets. 
           *, **, *** - statistically significant respectively at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
In general, the results do not show a significant response of revenue and primary 
spending to deviations of the debt-to-GDP ratio from its sample average for the full 
sample. In the first sub-sample (1979:1 – 1993:3), there is some evidence suggesting a 
weak stabilizing effect that works mainly through government spending: when the debt-
to-GDP ratio is above its historical mean, government primary spending decreases (the 
coefficient associated to (dt−1 − d*) is negative (-0.005), although some destabilizing 
effect then also occurs via the revenue side. In the second sub-sample (1993:4 – 
2007:4), the empirical findings show that government revenue plays some stabilizing 
effect: when the debt-to-GDP ratio is above its historical mean, government revenue 
increases as the coefficient associated to (dt−1 − d*) is positive (0.006). 
Therefore, we can conclude that when faced with high government indebtedness 
and fiscal imbalances in the Maastricht sub-period, the fiscal stabilization responses 
have been biased towards increases in government revenue. 
 18 
5.4 A VAR counter-factual exercise 
We now conduct a VAR counter-factual exercise aimed at describing the effects 
of shutting down the shocks in government spending or government revenue. In 
practice, after estimating the VAR summarized by (1), (2) and (3), we construct the 
counter-factual (CFT) series as follows: 

CFT
tti
CFT
t
CFT
tti
n
CFT
t
nn
cdXXdXL   

11101
1
...)(

  (10) 
tt
tt
t
tt
t
t
YP
TG
d
)μ)(π(
i
d




 1
11
1
               (11) 
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1
0 


CFT
tv .                     (12) 
This is equivalent to consider the following vector of structural shocks 
'
0, , , , , ,CFT T Y P i I Ct t t t t t t                         (13) 
'
,0, , , , ,CFT G Y P i I Ct t t t t t t          ,               (14) 
where we shut down, respectively in (13) and in (14), the government primary spending 
and the government revenue unexpected variation and then use the counter-factual 
structural shocks to build the counter-factual series for all endogenous variables of the 
system. 
This empirical exercise allows us to quantify the magnitude of fiscal policy 
shocks and its impact on a set of macroeconomic variables. Moreover, it helps us 
understanding what the dynamics of the economy would be in the absence of 
unexpected variation in fiscal policy. 
Figure 6a plots the actual and the counter-factual series for GDP, private 
consumption, private investment, and government spending in the case of a shock to 
government spending. Figure 6b displays the actual and the counter-factual series for 
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GDP, private consumption, private investment, and government revenue in the case of a 
shock to government revenue. 
[Figure 6] 
The results show that fiscal policy shocks play a minor role as the difference 
between the actual and the counterfactual series are relatively small. Nevertheless, one 
can see that in the absence of government spending shocks, private consumption and 
private investment would have been higher, for instance, in the period 1983-1988 and, 
more recently, since 2003. Therefore, such evidence suggests and confirms that 
unexpected increases in government spending generate relevant “crowding-out” effects, 
a useful insight to bear in mind when resorting to fiscal instruments to boost the 
economy. 
In the case of government revenue, the difference between the actual and the 
counterfactual series are negligible, a feature that may be related with the relative size 
of the government revenue shocks. In fact, while unexpected variation in government 
spending seems to be large – as follows from the larger differences between the actual 
government spending and the counter-factual government spending –, government 
revenue shocks are generally small. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper evaluates the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in Portugal for 
the period 1979:1-2007:4, drawing on a new set of quarterly data built from the monthly 
Central Government’s cash data. We identify fiscal policy shocks using: (i) a recursive 
partial scheme, and estimate a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression; and (ii) a 
Fully Simultaneous System approach, where we account for the automatic response of 
fiscal policy to the economic activity. Consequently, the use of such high frequency 
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fiscal data, which is quite valuable from a perspective of monitoring the fiscal position, 
turns out to be also rather useful from a modelling point of view. 
The empirical evidence suggests that government spending shocks: (i) have, in 
general, a negative effect on GDP; (ii) lead to a fall of both private consumption and 
private investment; (iii) rise persistently and positively the price level; and (iv) have 
mixed effects on the average cost of refinancing the debt. More specifically, a 1% 
positive shock in government spending has a maximum impact on GDP of -0.1%, while 
“crowding-out” both private consumption and private investment, which fall by 0.12% 
and 0.2%, respectively.  
In addition, government revenue shocks have a negative impact on GDP, on 
private consumption and on private investment, although the response emerges with a 
lag of about four quarters. In fact, at this horizon, a 1% positive shock in government 
revenue is able to generate a positive response of GDP by 0.06%, and an increase of 
both private consumption and private investment of 0.04% and 0.14%, respectively. 
After this, the macroeconomic effects of the tax shock erode and even become negative. 
These results suggest that an expansion of government spending is associated to 
an episode of fiscal deterioration. Similarly, an increase in government revenue is 
followed by a somewhat less disciplined fiscal policy. This helps explaining the 
different reaction of the cost of debt to the fiscal policy shock across the two 
identification methods. Nevetheless, the response of the other macroeconomic variables 
included in the different frameworks is qualitative and quantitative similar, which gives 
support to the policy implications of the paper and allows us to be confident on the 
correct identification of the unexpected variation in fiscal policy. 
When we explicitly consider the feedback from government debt, (long-term) 
interest rates become more responsive, GDP is marginally less responsive, and the 
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effects of fiscal policy on these variables also become more persistent. In addition, the 
results provide weak evidence of stabilizing effects of the debt level on the primary 
budget balance. 
In a nutshell, it is adequate to say that the results reinforce the idea that fiscal 
behaviour in Portugal came short of effectively consolidating public finances. 
Moreover, expansionary spending shocks have tended to lower real GDP growth. In 
addition, a VAR counter-factual exercise shows that unexpected spending shocks are 
responsible for important “crowding-out” effects. 
Therefore, the current study provides relevant policy implications, notably from 
the perspective of the fiscal authorities. Most important is the fact that expansionary 
fiscal policies in Portugal do not emerge as an obvious instrument to foster economic 
growth. On the other hand, and from an inflation control point of view, government 
spending also puts upwards pressure on the price level. 
Another significant result, to bear in mind by policymakers when implementing 
fiscal policy measures in a small open economy as Portugal, is the fact that when faced 
with high government indebtedness and fiscal imbalances, after the Maastricht Treaty 
entered into force, the fiscal stabilization responses have been biased towards increases 
in government revenue. Given the associated excess burden of taxation of such policies 
and the uncovered crowding-out effect of government spending, it would be advisable 
to consider designing fiscal policies from a perspective of reducing total government 
spending. Such approach, when pursued in good times, would contribute to consolidate 
public finances in a more sustained fashion, while allowing more leeway for an 
expansionary behaviour in crises, and still within the EU fiscal framework.  
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Appendix – Data description and sources 
GDP 
Data for GDP are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1978:1-
2007:4. The source is the Bank of Portugal. 
 
Private Consumption 
The source is the Bank of Portugal. Consumption is defined as the household 
consumption expenditure including non-profitable institutions serving households. Data 
are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1978:1-2007:4. 
 
Price Deflator 
All variables were deflated by the GDP deflator (2000=100). Data are quarterly, 
seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1978:1-2007:4. The source is the Bank of 
Portugal. 
 
Private Investment 
The source is the Bank of Portugal. Private Investment is defined as total gross fixed 
capital formation. Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 
1978:1-2007:4. 
 
Government Spending 
The source is the Bank of Portugal, collected from the Monthly Bulletin of the 
Directorate-General of Public Accounting. Government Spending is defined as Central 
Government primary spending (on a cash basis), that is, the difference between 
authorized expenditure and debt interest payments. We seasonally adjust quarterly data 
using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1978:1-2007:4. 
 
Interest Payments 
The source is the Bank of Portugal, collected from the Monthly Bulletin of the 
Directorate-General of Public Accounting. Interest Payments is defined as Central 
Government debt interest payments (on a cash basis). We seasonally adjust quarterly 
data using Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1978:1-2007:4. 
 
Government Revenue 
The source is the Bank of Portugal, collected from the Monthly Bulletin of the 
Directorate-General of Public Accounting. Government Revenue is defined as Central 
Government total revenue (on a cash basis). We seasonally adjust quarterly data using 
Census X12 ARIMA, and the series comprise the period 1978:1-2007:4. 
 
Government Debt 
The source is the Bank of Portugal, the Directorate-General of Treasury, and the 
Directorate-General of Public Credit. Government Debt is defined as the stock of Direct 
State Debt.  
The original series are available as follows:  
 
1.  
a) Total Internal Debt, for the period 1997:12-1994:6, on a quarterly basis; 
b) Internal Direct Debt, for the period 1997:12-1994:6, on a quarterly basis; 
c) Total External Debt, for the period 1997:12-1994:6, on a quarterly basis; 
d) Direct External Debt, for the period 1997:12-1994:6, on a quarterly basis; 
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e) Total Public Debt, for the period 1997:12-1994:6, on a quarterly basis; 
f) Effective Public Debt, for the period 1997:12-1994:6, on a quarterly basis; 
2.  
a) Internal Effective Direct Debt, for the periods 1991:12, 1992:12, and 1993:6-
1995:11, on a monthly basis; 
b) Total Effective Direct Debt, for the periods 1991:12, 1992:12, and 1993:6-
1995:11, on a monthly basis 
3.  
a) Internal Direct Debt, for the period 1995:7-1998:12, on a monthly basis; 
b) Total Direct Debt, for the period 1995:7-1998:12, on a monthly basis 
4. 
a) Direct State Debt, for the period 1998:12-2007:4, on a monthly basis. 
 
We build the series for the Direct State Debt as follows: 
1) For the period 1998:12-2008:4, as the series of Direct State Debt itself; 
2) For the period 1995:7-1997:12, we use the ratio of Direct State Debt to Total 
State Debt in 1998:12 (that is, a scale factor of 0.994679113), to back-out the 
series of Direct State Debt; 
3) For the period 1993:6-1995:6, we use the ratio of Total Effective Direct State 
Debt to Total Direct State Debt in the period 1995:7-1995:11 (that is, a scale 
factor of 1.002277388), to back-out the series of Total Direct Debt; 
4) For the period 1977:12-1993:3, we use the ratio of (Effective Public Debt minus 
Non-Direct Debt) to Total Effective Direct Debt in the period 1993:6-1994:6 
(that is, a scale factor of 1.03997385), to back-out the series of Total Effective 
Direct Debt. 
Given that the scale factors are very close to one, the time series of the Direct State Debt 
is smooth over time and we guarantee that there are not structural breaks. 
We build the quarterly series using monthly data (where available) and seasonally adjust 
it using Census X12 ARIMA. The constructed series comprise the period 1977:4-
2007:4. 
 
Average Cost of Financing Debt 
The average cost of financing debt is obtained by dividing interest payments by debt at 
time t-1. 
 
Long-Term Interest Rate 
Long-Term Interest Rate corresponds to the yield to maturity of 10-year government 
securities. Data are quarterly, and comprise the period 1957:1-2007:4. Data for the 
period 1974:2-1975:4 is not available. Therefore, we linearly interpolate the data for 
that period using the observations at 1974:1 and 1976:1. The source is the IMF, 
International Financial Statistics (series " IFS.Q.182.6.61.$$$.Z.F.$$$"). 
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Figure 1 – Monetary conditions and fiscal balances in Portugal 
(2000-2008). 
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Source: EC, Eurostat, Banco de Portugal, and own calculations. 
Notes: HICP, September 2008, Euribor, October 2008, and EC Autumn 2008 forecasts for 
CAPB in 2008. EDP – Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Average cost of servicing debt and 
(annualized) nominal GDP growth. 
Figure 3 - Implicit debt ratio and observed debt ratio, 
percentage of GDP. 
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Figure 4 – Impulse-response functions: the Bayesian Structural VAR. 
4a – spending shock 
 
4b – revenue shock 
 
 
Notes: The solid line corresponds to the median estimate when the model is estimated without accounting for the 
feedback from government debt; the dotted line corresponds to the median estimate and the dashed lines indicate the 
68 per cent posterior confidence intervals estimated by using an Importance Sampling Normalized Weights algorithm 
based on 50000 draws, when the debt dynamics is included in the model. 
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Figure 5 – Impulse-response functions: the Fully Simultaneous System approach. 
5a – spending shock 
 
5b – revenue shock 
 
Notes: The solid line corresponds to the median estimate when the model is estimated without accounting for the 
feedback from government debt; the dotted line corresponds to the median estimate and the dashed lines indicate the 
68 per cent posterior confidence intervals estimated by using an Importance Sampling Normalized Weights algorithm 
based on 50000 draws, when the debt dynamics is included in the model. 
30 
 
Figure 6 – VAR counterfactual. 
6a – spending shock 
 
 
6b – revenue shock 
 
 Note: All series are in logs of real terms. 
 
